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ABSTRACT
Despite tremendous success of modern neural networks, they are
known to be overconfident even when the model encounters inputs
with unfamiliar conditions. Detecting such inputs is vital to pre-
venting models from making naive predictions that may jeopardize
real-world applications of neural networks. In this paper, we address
the challenging problem of devising a simple yet effective measure
of uncertainty in deep neural networks. Specifically, we propose
to utilize backpropagated gradients to quantify the uncertainty of
trained models. Gradients depict the required amount of change for
a model to properly represent given inputs, thus providing a valuable
insight into how familiar and certain the model is regarding the in-
puts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of gradients as a measure of
model uncertainty in applications of detecting unfamiliar inputs, in-
cluding out-of-distribution and corrupted samples. We show that our
gradient-based method outperforms state-of-the-art methods by up
to 4.8% of AUROC score in out-of-distribution detection and 35.7%
in corrupted input detection.
Index Terms— gradients, uncertainty, unfamiliar input detec-
tion, out-of-distribution, image corruption/distortion
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant improve-
ments in a variety of applications, including object detection [1], im-
age classification [2], and natural language processing [3]. Despite
these advancements, DNNs are prone to failure when deployed in
real-world environments as they often encounter data that diverges
from training conditions [4, 5]. Neural networks make predictions
regardless of their familiarity with given inputs. Combined with
their overconfident nature [6, 7], the difficulty in distinguishing naive
predictions about unfamiliar inputs from knowledgeable predictions
about familiar inputs hinders practical implementation of DNNs. To
ensure a certain level of reliable performance, models must be ca-
pable of identifying unfamiliar inputs, which then can be handled
via predetermined fallback mechanisms instead of making erroneous
conjectures.
At the core of detecting unfamiliar inputs lies the concept of
uncertainty and the methodology to measure it. In this work, we
mainly consider model uncertainty, which refers to the uncertainty
in model parameters due to limited data and knowledge [8]. It is
directly related to the problem of out-of-distribution (OOD) detec-
tion, where the goal is to detect the samples drawn from differ-
ent data distribution than in-distribution or training samples. Re-
cent studies [9, 10] utilized the prediction probability statistics as an
uncertainty measure. Hendrycks & Gimpel [9] introduced a base-
𝜃𝜃′ ∝ 𝛻 𝐽 𝜃Space of Models∈ ℝ(
Loss manifold∈ ℝ()*
Fig. 1: Illustration of a space of models.
line method of thresholding samples based on the predicted soft-
max probability. Liang et al. [10] improved their method with in-
put and output processing to further distinguish in-distribution and
OOD samples. DeVries & Taylor [11] utilized prediction confidence
as an uncertainty measure, obtained from an augmented confidence
estimation branch on a pre-trained classifier. Lee et al. [12] pro-
posed a confidence metric with Mahalanobis distance to character-
ize OOD samples. These approaches investigate model uncertainty
with activation-based measures and typically utilize additional mod-
ules for pre- and post-processing as well as quantifying uncertainty
that require calibrations.
In this work, we propose a simple yet effective method to mea-
sure model uncertainty of deep neural networks. Specifically, we
utilize backpropagated gradients to probe the knowledge of fully
trained networks and determine the model’s familiarity with given
inputs. Our intuition is that gradients correspond to the amount of
changes it requires to properly represent a given sample. In compar-
ison with aforementioned activation-based methods [9, 10, 11, 12],
our method in estimating model uncertainty takes into account both
activation and loss associated with given inputs as well as the rela-
tionship between the two, preserving more information about model
uncertainty. In addition, our method does not require any calibration
or extra processing. We empirically show that our gradient-based
method outperforms activation-based methods across multiple tasks
and datasets. The contributions of this paper are three-fold.
• We provide an interpretation of gradients in the space of models
from a perspective of model uncertainty.
• We introduce an efficient framework to generate gradients for un-
certainty characterization.
• We apply our gradient-based approach to applications of out-of-
distribution detection and corrupted input detection to achieve the
state-of-the-art performance.
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2. BACKGROUND
Given any single network architecture, the set of models is defined
by all possible configurations of its parameters. In the immense
space of these models, we manage to find a seemingly endless num-
ber of parameterizations that perform well via various initialization
and optimization techniques. In particular, stochastic gradient-based
optimization has been fundamental to the success of modern neural
networks. It is built on the assumption that the model is defined on
a relatively smooth space where the first derivatives exist [13]. Each
update of gradient-based optimization, as shown in Eq. (1), aims to
minimize an objective function J(θ) with respect to model parame-
ters θ ∈ Rd by updating the parameters in the opposite direction of
the gradients of the objective function∇θJ(θ).
θ′ = θ − η · ∇θJ(θ) (1)
The direction of the gradients determines the direction of the up-
date, and the magnitude of gradients scaled by learning rate η gov-
erns the size of the update. It is a process of maneuvering the space of
models from one parameterization to another. In Fig. 1, we visualize
a space of models for an architecture of two parameters and its arbi-
trary loss manifold. The model space is two-dimensional as defined
by the number of parameters. The loss manifold is depicted with one
extra dimension since, for each parameterization, a loss value can be
computed with respect to a given input. In training, each iteration
involves finding a model parameterization by optimizing on the loss
manifold. On the space of models, a model that performs better than
the current parameterization lies in the opposite direction of the gra-
dients at a distance of some proportion of the gradient magnitude.
3. GRADIENTS AS A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY
Gradient-based optimization involves larger updates when there is a
larger gap between predictions and correct labels for given inputs.
It implies that the model requires more significant adjustments to its
parameters, as it has not learned enough features to represent the in-
puts or relationships between learned features and classes for correct
prediction. We propose to utilize gradients to quantify uncertainty of
fully trained neural networks. Our intuition is that the magnitude of
the gradients is directly proportional to the amount of each update
in training. In the context of the space of models, the size of each
update represents the distance between two distinct model parame-
terizations: one before the update (θ) and the other afterward (θ′), as
shown in Fig. 1. We can exploit this idea of distance in the space of
models, represented by the magnitude of gradients, as a measure of
uncertainty. During inference, gradients can be generated in a sim-
ilar manner as in training process. The obtained gradients are not
pertinent to model updates; however, they contain more reliable in-
formation about the familiarity of the model with given inputs, as the
model in question is a converged solution and the required model up-
date should not be drastic for inputs that are similar to training data.
In the following sections, we describe the process of generating and
utilizing such gradients in detail.
3.1. Gradient generation framework
To use gradients as a measure of uncertainty for a fully trained net-
work, we first address the process of obtaining gradients. It requires
backpropagation of arbitrary loss between predictions that the model
made for given inputs and their ground truth labels; however, the la-
bels are not available at inference. While we may be able to analyze
gradients for every class that the model is trained for, the number
of loss and gradient computations increases linearly with the num-
ber of possible classes for the model. For a more efficient gradient
generation process, we construct confounding labels. We define a
confounding label as a label that is different from ordinary labels on
which a model is trained. In an image classification setting, an or-
dinary label consists of a single class (i.e. one-hot vector), whereas
a confounding label may include multiple classes or none—a vector
of length C with n number of 1’s where C is the number of classes
in training and n ∈ {0, . . . , C} \ {1}. We describe the effect of a
confounding label in Fig. 2(a). Consider a trained classifier that is
trained with images and labels of two classes: “dog” and “horse”.
With an ordinary label (i.e. “dog” or “horse”), when a model is fa-
miliar with an input image, the model has features learned during
training to represent the input. In addition, the model is able to asso-
ciate the already-learned features with one of the trained classes pro-
vided by the given ordinary label. On the other hand, a confounding
label is specifically designed to be unfamiliar to the model. With a
confounding label (i.e. “car”) and a familiar input, the model does
not need to learn features again. The only necessary adjustments
to model parameters would be to learn the relationship between the
already-learned features and the confounding label. If the model is
unfamiliar with the given input, however, the amount of updates re-
quired to 1) learn new features to properly represent the new input,
and 2) associate the new features with the confounding label, would
Model associates learned features 
with the trained label“dog”
Update: associate learned features 
with the new label
Update: learn new features and 
associate them with the new label
Model response / Required updateInput image & label
( Model familiarity:            ) 
“car”
“car”
“dog” “horse”Trained 
classifier
(a) The effect of a confounding label.
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(b) Gradient generation framework with confounding label.
Fig. 2: Quantifying uncertainty of neural networks with gradients. Confounding labels are utilized for effective gradient generation.
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(a) Squared L2 norms of gradients at different parameter sets: ‖∇J(θ)‖22.
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Fig. 3: Comparison between gradients and loss in distinguishing in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets. Each plot shows distributions
of per-class average values of considered attributes (‖∇J(θ)‖22 or J(θ)) for all datasets.
be larger.
We discuss the framework to collect gradients with confounding
labels from a fully trained network in Fig. 2(b). Given an input im-
age, the model yields logits. We utilize binary cross entropy loss be-
tween the logits and a confounding label as shown in Eq. (2), where
yˆi is the predicted probability for class i and yi is the true probabil-
ity represented by the confounding label. Through backpropagation
of the loss, gradients are generated for each set of model parameters
(i.e. weight and bias parameters of network layers). While any form
of conserving the magnitude would be valid, we measure the squared
L2 distance of the gradients for each parameter set and concatenate
them to represent the given input.
J(θ) =
1
C
C∑
i=0
(yi · log (yˆi) + (1− yi) · log (1− yˆi)) (2)
3.2. Demonstration of the effectiveness of gradients
To demonstrate the effectiveness of gradients as a measure of
model uncertainty, we present preliminary experiments in out-of-
distribution detection setups. First, we train a ResNet-18 [2] model
with the training set of MNIST [14]. The trained model is then
used to generate gradients as described in Section 3.1 on the test
sets of MNIST, CIFAR-10 [15], TinyImageNet [16], LSUN [17],
and SVHN [18]. MNIST is chosen to be an in-distribution dataset
as it is the simplest among all considered datasets. We employ a
network architecture that is large enough to learn classification for
all datasets. With the magnitude of gradients, we show the disparity
between the learned features in training and the necessary features
to represent test images.
In Fig. 3(a), we visualize the distributions of per-class average
magnitude of gradients, captured in different parameter sets of the
model. Note that the distribution of MNIST is highlighted in red
circle in each plot for clarity. The separation between in-distribution
and OOD datasets is more evident in some parts of the network than
others because each layer captures information about different as-
pects of given inputs. But overall, we observe a sharp distinction
based on the familiarity of the model, with smaller gradient mag-
nitude for in-distribution/familiar datasets and significantly larger
for OOD/unfamiliar datasets. In addition, we show the distribution
of loss values in Fig. 3(b) for further analysis. Gradients and loss
are intertwined in the process of backpropagation, but the loss is
limited to a single value per iteration. We observe apparent over-
laps of loss values across different datasets, demonstrating that loss
alone is inadequate for detecting unfamiliar inputs. On the contrary,
the gradients are of the same dimensions as their corresponding pa-
rameter sets, preserving more information about the current state of
the model and the necessary adjustment for better representation of
given inputs.
4. EXPERIMENTS
We validate the effectiveness of our proposed method in applica-
tions that deal with some form of unfamiliar inputs, including out-
of-distribution detection and corrupted input detection. For each
application, we distinguish the familiarity of datasets based on the
model training process—familiar if the model has been exposed to
the dataset in training and unfamiliar otherwise. Specifically, we
train ResNet with 18 layers on training set of a dataset and obtain
gradient-based representations from test sets of both familiar and
unfamiliar datasets. To generate gradients, we utilize a confound-
ing label where all classes are positive (i.e. a vector of all 1’s). For
each set of familiar and unfamiliar datasets, we use a 40%-40%-
20% train-validation-test split of the collected gradient representa-
tions and train a simple binary detector of 2 fully-connected layers
as an unfamiliar input detector.
4.1. Out-of-distribution detection
For out-of-distribution (OOD) detection experiments, we use var-
ious image classification datasets: CIFAR-10 and SVHN as in-
distribution, additional TinyImageNet and LSUN as OOD. For fair
comparison, we utilize the same experiment setups to replicate re-
sults from other state-of-the-art OOD methods [9, 10, 12]. For
evaluation, we measure the following metrics: detection accuracy,
area under receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC), and
area under precision-recall curve (AUPR). The results of OOD de-
tection are reported in Table 1 and the method with the best result
for each metric is highlighted. While both ODIN [10] and Maha-
lanobis [12] methods involve input and output processing, we report
vanilla results (i.e. without any processing) for Mahalanobis method
as it shows better performance than ODIN when the additional pro-
cedures are allowed. Note that these procedures require delicate
calibration of hyperparameters, while our method does not require
any. We observe that our method outperforms all other techniques
when CIFAR-10 is used as in-distribution and SVHN as OOD, and
SVHN as in-distribution and all others as OOD, up to 9% increase
Table 1: The results of distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data on OOD benchmarks. All values are in percentages
and the best results are highlighted in bold. For Mahalanobis [12] method, V indicates vanilla results without input pre-processing
or feature ensemble, and P+FE includes both.
Dataset Distribution Detection Accuracy AUROC AUPR
In Out Baseline [9] / ODIN [10] / Mahalanobis (V) [12] / Mahalanobis (P+FE) [12] / Ours
CIFAR-10
SVHN 83.36 / 88.81 / 79.39 / 91.95 / 98.04 88.30 / 94.93 / 85.03 / 97.10 / 99.84 88.26 / 95.45 / 86.15 / 96.12 / 99.98
TinyImageNet 84.01 / 85.21 / 83.60 / 97.45 / 86.17 90.06 / 91.86 / 88.93 / 99.68 / 93.18 89.26 / 91.60 / 88.59 / 99.60 / 92.66
LSUN 87.34 / 88.42 / 85.02 / 98.60 / 98.37 92.79 / 94.48 / 90.11 / 99.86 / 99.86 92.30 / 94.22 / 89.80 / 99.82 / 99.87
SVHN
CIFAR-10 79.98 / 80.12 / 74.10 / 88.84 / 97.90 81.50 / 81.49 / 79.31 / 95.05 / 99.79 81.01 / 80.95 / 80.83 / 90.25 / 98.11
TinyImageNet 81.70 / 81.92 / 79.35 / 96.17 / 97.74 83.69 / 83.82 / 83.85 / 99.23 / 99.77 82.54 / 82.60 / 85.50 / 98.17 / 97.93
LSUN 80.96 / 81.15 / 79.52 / 97.50 / 99.04 82.85 / 82.98 / 83.02 / 99.54 / 99.93 81.97 / 82.01 / 84.67 / 98.84 / 99.21
in performance. Our method is especially effective when there is
a larger difference in the complexity of in-distribution and OOD
datasets. SVHN comprises color images of house numbers ranging
from 0 to 9, while the other datasets include more complex natural
images of diverse classes. Our method still shows very comparable
result when the model is trained on CIFAR-10 and LSUN is used
as OOD. We remark that our gradient-based method outperforms all
activation-based methods in most cases.
4.2. Corrupted input detection
In addition to model uncertainty, we consider aleatoric uncertainty,
another type of uncertainty that is related to noise in observations [8].
Some examples of the cause of this uncertainty are imperfect data ac-
quisition and environmental factors such as motion blur or weather
conditions. Aleatoric uncertainty is considered irreducible even with
more data due to the inherent nature of noise, so most approaches fo-
cus on designing a robust system that can handle both pristine and
noisy inputs. We apply our gradient-based uncertainty measure to
directly detect corrupted inputs. We utilize the Mahalanobis method
from out-of-distribution detection as a comparison, as corrupted in-
puts can also be considered as OOD examples and the Mahalanobis
method shows the best performance among all compared methods.
For corrupted input detection experiments, we use image clas-
sification datasets that are designed for benchmarking robustness of
neural networks with realistic challenging conditions. CIFAR-10-
C [19] consists of 19 diverse corruption types of 4 categories, in-
cluding noise, blur, weather and digital, at 5 different severity levels
that are applied to validation images of CIFAR-10 dataset. CURE-
TSR [20] is a traffic sign recognition dataset that includes real-world
and simulated challenging conditions of 11 types and 5 severity lev-
els. For each dataset, a model is trained on training images that
are free of corruptions, and the gradients are collected for test sets
of both pristine and corrupted images. Among all image corruption
types from both datasets, we select common or similar ones to report
AUROC scores in Table 2. For CIFAR-10-C dataset, our method
outperforms the Mahalanobis method for all corruption types and
levels. It shows saturated performance even from severity level 1,
while the Mahalanobis method generally shows an increase at higher
levels of corruption. Regarding CURE-TSR dataset, our method
still outperforms in most cases and show comparable results other-
wise, but both methods show more variations in performance across
severity levels of corruptions. Note the gap in AUROC scores be-
tween the methods at lower levels of corruptions—this implies that
our gradient-based method can characterize corruptions effectively,
compared to the activation-based method, even at a subtle degree.
Table 2: The results of distinguishing pristine and corrupted im-
ages. All values are AUROC scores in percentages and the best
results are highlighted in bold.
D
at
as
et Method Mahalanobis [12] / Ours
Corruption Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
C
IF
A
R
-1
0-
C
Noise 96.63 / 99.95 98.73 / 99.97 99.46 / 99.99 99.62 / 99.97 99.71 / 99.99
LensBlur 94.22 / 99.95 97.51 / 99.99 99.26 / 100.0 99.78 / 100.0 99.89 / 100.0
GaussianBlur 94.19 / 99.94 99.28 / 100.0 99.76 / 100.0 99.86 / 100.0 99.80 / 100.0
DirtyLens 93.37 / 99.94 95.31 / 99.93 95.66 / 99.96 95.37 / 99.92 97.43 / 99.96
Exposure 91.39 / 99.87 91.00 / 99.85 90.71 / 99.88 90.58 / 99.85 90.68 / 99.87
Snow 93.64 / 99.94 96.50 / 99.94 94.44 / 99.95 94.22 / 99.95 95.25 / 99.92
Haze 95.52 / 99.95 98.35 / 99.99 99.28 / 100.0 99.71 / 99.99 99.94 / 100.0
Decolor 93.51 / 99.96 93.55 / 99.96 90.30 / 99.82 89.86 / 99.75 90.43 / 99.83
C
U
R
E
-T
SR
Noise 25.46 / 50.20 47.54 / 63.87 47.32 / 81.20 66.19 / 91.16 83.14 / 94.81
LensBlur 48.06 / 72.63 71.61 / 87.58 86.59 / 92.56 92.19 / 93.90 94.90 / 95.65
GaussianBlur 66.44 / 83.07 77.67 / 86.94 93.15 / 94.35 80.78 / 94.51 97.36 / 96.53
DirtyLens 29.78 / 51.21 29.28 / 59.10 46.60 / 82.10 73.36 / 91.87 98.50 / 98.70
Exposure 74.90 / 88.13 99.96 / 96.78 99.99 / 99.26 100.0 / 99.80 100.0 / 99.90
Snow 28.11 / 61.34 61.28 / 80.52 89.89 / 91.30 99.34 / 96.13 99.98 / 97.66
Haze 66.51 / 95.83 97.86 / 99.50 100.0 / 99.95 100.0 / 99.87 100.0 / 99.88
Decolor 48.37 / 62.36 60.55 / 81.30 71.73 / 89.93 87.29 / 95.42 89.68 / 96.91
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple yet effective measure of uncer-
tainty in deep neural networks with backpropagated gradients. We
introduced the concept of the space of models in terms of optimiza-
tion and motivated the utility of gradients as a distance measure in
the space of model that corresponds to the required amount of ad-
justment to model parameters to properly represent given inputs. We
designed a framework for efficient generation of gradients with con-
founding labels, and utilized the gradients to quantify uncertainty of
fully trained networks regarding the given inputs. We validated our
approach in the applications of detecting unfamiliar inputs, includ-
ing out-of-distribution samples and corrupted images. Our gradient-
based method outperforms activation-based state-of-the-art methods
by up to 4.8% of AUROC score in out-of-distribution detection and
35.7% in corrupted input detection.
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